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Abstract 
 
Information systems (IS) projects are famous for experiencing severe cost overruns, which amongst 
others are often caused by inaccurate ex-ante cost estimations. Against this background, this article 
presents a descriptive case study located in an IS transformation program at a major German 
financial services provider. In this case study, a multi-stage cost estimation process, which was 
applied to 79 IS projects, is described and the estimation accuracy of the cost estimations of all IS 
projects is determined using different estimation accuracy measures: Estimating Quality Factor, 
Forecast Error, and Mean Absolute Percentage Error. Depending on the concrete estimation 
accuracy measure used for the evaluation, the overall estimation quality of the program turns out to 
be evaluated as good or at least average – which seems to be contrary to most studies in scientific 
literature. However, the results further reveal that the estimation accuracy also depends on the 
estimation accuracy measure chosen for the evaluation. These differing judgements are discussed 
from a management perspective. 
Keywords: IT Project Management, IS Projects, Cost Overruns, Estimation Accuracy. 
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1 Introduction 
Failing IS projects have drawn attention throughout their history. The success or failure of IS projects 
are usually measured along three criteria: scope, schedule, and budget (Jurison 1999; Sauer et al. 
2007). The relevance of these criteria is demonstrated in a lot of famous examples of failed IS projects 
reported in literature (Goldfinch 2007; Krigsman 2008; McFarlan 1981; Newcombe 1998; Oz 1994). 
Many authors examined the reasons for project failure in general (Zimmerer and Yasin 1998) and IS 
projects in particular (El Emam and Koru 2008; Nelson 2007; Whittaker 1999). Cerpa and Verner 
(2009) e.g. analysed 70 failed IS projects and concluded that more than 80% were underestimated. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) discovered that decision makers tend to underestimate costs, time to 
completion, and risks, whereas the same people usually overestimate benefits. Especially in the 
context of IS projects, several studies revealed that project managers tend to overestimate their own 
capabilities (Atkinson et al. 2006; Budzier and Flyvbjerg 2011). Though there are numerous methods 
for estimating parameters of IS projects, Eveleens and Verhoef (2009) conclude that these kinds of 
bias lead to wrong project evaluations. Due to biases inherent in the estimates, the authors state that 
quantifying the estimation accuracy “provides crucial information for executives to help steer their 
organization“ (Eveleens and Verhoef 2009, p. 935). This is confirmed by Jørgensen (2007), who states 
that estimation accuracy is still a major topic of interest within IS research. 
Important approaches that attempt to determine estimation accuracy emerged already several decades 
ago (see e.g. Boehm 1981 or DeMarco 1982). But given the huge body of literature about cost 
overruns of IS projects, there are only very few studies that analyse the estimation accuracy inherent in 
IS projects. Therefore, only little information about estimation accuracy is available so far. Even 
worse, since there is only little information available, the interpretation of the resulting values for the 
estimation accuracy is difficult (see e.g. Eveleens and Verhoef 2009; Little 2005). 
Against this background, our paper presents a descriptive case study of a large IS transformation 
program consisting of more than 90 IS projects at a large German financial service provider (FSP). 
Within this program, the costs of these IS projects were estimated by experts at different stages of the 
projects. We were able to gather the cost estimations for 79 IS projects that were estimated according 
to the same estimation process. Therefore, this data allows for the evaluation of the estimation 
accuracy. In order to do so, we determined the estimation accuracy for every IS project (each having 
multiple cost estimates) using different approaches, since this allows for a comparison of the different 
approaches. To guide the research throughout the paper, the following research questions are posed: 
How was the estimation accuracy within the IS transformation program of the FSP? 
How suitable are current methods for determining the accuracy of cost estimations for IS projects? 
To answer this question, this paper is organised as follows: The next section provides the theoretical 
background and therefore cost estimation methods as well as methods for the determination of 
estimation accuracy are introduced. Further, the research methodology is described. Section 3 presents 
the case study: After some general information about the IS transformation program, the processes for 
cost estimations are described. After that, the estimation accuracy is determined using different 
estimation accuracy measures. Further, the findings of the case study as well as its implications and 
limitations are discussed. The last section sums up and concludes the paper. 
2 Research Background and Research Methodology 
First, this section sums up the literature concerning cost estimations methods and measures for 
determining estimation accuracy. Then, the research methodology, namely a case study, is presented. 
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In order to derive conclusions about the estimation accuracy of the forecasted costs, it is important to 
understand how the costs were estimated. There are several different types of cost estimation methods 
(for a systematic review, the interested reader is referred to Jørgensen and Shepperd (2007)). In the 
following, we briefly describe expert-based judgements in order to provide the theoretical background 
for the cost estimation methods used in the IS transformation program. 
Expert-based judgements rather rely on past experience of experts. Mukhopadhyay et al. (1992) find – 
in congruence with Bergeron and St-Arnaud (1992) – that experts perform best when predicting the 
costs for an IS project. However, as Molokken and Jørgensen (2003) state, expert based estimation 
techniques can also lead to skewed results due to unclear questions or – as mentioned in the 
introduction – too optimistic estimates due to biases. There are also several documented applications 
of expert-based estimations within scientific literature. Within these studies students are often 
considered as experts and asked for their estimations (see e.g. Höst and Wohlin 1997; Johnson et al. 
2000; Ohlsson et al. 1998; Prechelt and Unger 2001). Jørgensen (2004) is the only article known to the 
authors that evaluates experts’ cost estimations by determining budget overruns in a business 
environment. He applies cost estimation methods to IS projects in a real-life business environment and 
reports average budget overruns of 19% and 45% (depending on the chosen estimation method). 
However, these figures were not used in real-life projects and thus don’t have any management 
purpose. In addition, the estimated costs – and hence project sizes – are relatively low in all studies. 
Hence, these studies are hardly comparable to the given research setting, which will be described in 
greater detail later on.  
According to Dysert (2006, p. 1), estimation accuracy is the “degree to which a measurement or 
calculation varies to its actual value; thus estimate accuracy is an indication of the degree to which the 
final cost outcome of a project may vary from the single point value used as the estimated cost for the 
project”. This approach was formalised for instance by Hyndman and Koehler (2006) and denoted as 
Forecast Error (FE). The FE is therefore defined as 
FE = Act – Est 
with Act standing for the actual realised costs and Est for the estimated and thus forecasted values. If 
the FE amounts to 0, the estimation quality can be interpreted as very good, whereas deviations in 
either direction represent lower estimation quality. A major weakness of the measurement of absolute 
deviations is that the results do not contain any information about the size of the projects. Therefore it 
is difficult to compare the results. In order to address this shortcoming, relative instead of absolute 
figures are often used. 
One popular measure for the relative determination of estimation accuracy is the Mean Absolute 
Percentage Error (MAPE) (Hyndman and Koehler 2006). Despite the term ‘absolute’, the MAPE 
determines the relative deviation of the cost estimations from the actual realised costs. Literature on 
software cost estimations labels this figure (Mean) Magnitude of Relative Error ((M)MRE; cf. Conte et 
al. 1985; Mukhopadhyay et al. 1992; Vicinanza et al. 1991). The MAPE is defined as follows: 
MAPE = (Act – Est) / Act 
The MAPE is criticised for returning distorted results if the Act value is close to zero (especially 
between 0 and 1). As Hyndman and Koehler (2006) further state, MAPE puts a heavier penalty on 
positive deviations than on negative deviations, although the deviation is the same in absolute values. 
Consequently, we will slightly adapt MAPE and introduce the so called MAPE(Est) as a similar 
measure, which is defined as follows: 
MAPE(Est) = (Act – Est) / Est 
It puts the absolute deviation in relation to the estimate instead of the actual value. Further, it has the 
advantage that, contrary to MAPE, in most cases, positive and negative deviations are treated equally. 
Additionally, this was the measure requested by management in the case study described later. 
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But despite measuring absolute or relative deviations there are also several methods that were 
explicitly developed to determine estimation accuracy. Two famous approaches emerged several 
decades ago, the Cone of Uncertainty introduced by Boehm (1981) and the Estimating Quality Factor 
(EQF) introduced by DeMarco (1982). The former tool is used to measure deviations between 
forecasts and realised values by plotting ratios over the duration of the projects, whereas the latter 
quantifies the quality of forecasts of the estimators by quantifying the deviations between the forecasts 
and the realised values (Eveleens and Verhoef 2009). According to Eveleens and Verhoef (2009, p. 
946), the EQF enables the assessment of „the quality of individual forecasts, but more importantly, the 
quality of the process of IT forecasting“. Furthermore, the EQF requires estimation data of several 
points in time during a project and – in contrast to the Cone of Uncertainty – aggregates this 
information to one key figure. Since the aggregation of estimation accuracy to one key figure has 
several advantages like e.g. a better interpretation or the comparability, we prefer the EQF to the Cone 
of Uncertainty and will describe this measure in greater detail in the following. 
The EQF compares the actual realised value to different estimates that were made over time. Each 
estimated value is further weighted with the time the estimate was valid, whereas the realised value is 
weighted with the total time of the project. Therefore, according to Eveleens and Verhoef (2009), the 
EQF can be expressed as: 
 =
	
	ℎ	
	

	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According to Shelley (1993), the EQF further has the advantages that it encourages re-estimations and 
can be applied to a broad variety of IS projects. However, as he further states, it is important to note 
that – like all methods which rely on actual costs accrued – the insights generated by analyzing the 
EQF will be of little use to currently ongoing projects, as the EQF is an “after-the-fact measure” 
(Shelley 1993, p. 76) and therefore its insights are primarily useful for future projects. 
Unfortunately there is no precise interpretation of the value obtained via the EQF. But if one 
aggregates single EQFs to an overall EQF, it is useful to rather use the median than the average value. 
This is due to the fact that outliers have a stronger influence on the average that on the median value 
(Eveleens and Verhoef 2009). DeMarco (1982) reported a median value of 3.8 for the software 
industry. Compared to that, Little (2005) analysed 100 software projects and concluded that 
“approximately 10 percent of (…) [the] projects had EQFs lower than 2.8, half the projects had EQFs 
less than the median of 4.8, and 90 percent of the projects had EQFs lower than 11.7”. Eveleens and 
Verhoef (2009) analyse estimation accuracy for a FSP using the EQF. They report a median EQF 
value of 8.5. Despite all these results, there is no objective interpretation of EQF values. 
Summing up, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is only little real world data provided within 
scientific literature that allows for an interpretation of estimation accuracy. Furthermore, most of the 
existing studies base their determination of the estimation quality only on single accuracy measures 
(except for the article written by Eveleens and Verhoef (2009)). Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
add knowledge and data to this stream of research by providing a detailed descriptive case study of a 
large IS transformation program of a German FSP. Within this case study, the estimation accuracy of 
the costs of a total of 79 IS projects is determined using different estimation accuracy methods. 
Despite the huge interest in cost estimation accuracy of IS projects, there is no clear understanding of 
how to interpret the derived estimation accuracy figures. Literature agrees that given a limited 
knowledge base as outlined so far, a case study is an appropriate research methodology (Benbasat et 
al. 1987; Eisenhardt 1989; Dubé and Paré 2003; Yin 2009). Another reason for selecting a case study 
research strategy is the fact that the IS projects under consideration are contemporary phenomena in a 
real-life context (Yin 2009, p. 8). 
Therefore a descriptive case study was chosen as research methodology in order to describe the 
accuracy of cost estimations for IS projects. The projects were located within an IS transformation 
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program at a German FSP. As the cost estimation rules were already established within the program 
and therefore the behaviour of the participants could not be controlled, an in-depth case research 
approach was chosen (Yin 2009). This approach allowed the researchers to study the phenomenon in 
its natural setting. Due to this positivistic character of the context, a descriptive case study seems 
adequate; it constitutes the next iteration (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 546) towards a theory on measuring and 
interpreting the quality of cost estimations for IS projects. 
During the whole duration of the program (from winter 2008 until autumn 2012), the data on the cost 
estimations of the IS projects was centrally collected in the program management office (PMO). The 
PMO was the organizational unit that was responsible for gathering, storing, and publishing the cost 
estimations for all IS projects in the different phases. Within the first two years, the data was kept 
within an excel spreadsheet; at a later point during the program, the excel spreadsheet was amended by 
a database. Regarding the cost figures, there were two data sources: On the one hand, the costs for 
human resources were computed automatically within a time-capturing tool (via multiplying the 
captured hours by an hour rate). However, this way the time capturing tool did not include other cost 
than human resources, as for instance fix prices, software, hardware, etc. That is why, on the other 
hand, the costs figures for the projects were delivered monthly from the accounting department via an 
excel spreadsheet; its figures were exported from SAP accounting systems. As the data from the 
accounting department were more complete and the FSP included them in its books, they were used 
for the data analysis. The information on the dates of the cost estimations was taken from different 
sources, depending on the particular phase. The dates for the baseline budget derived from 
presentations to the management board during the beginning of the program, in which the budget was 
formally approved; the date for the all other phases were taken from the official (weekly) project status 
reports which included the current milestones for a project specifically. Each milestone was a 
particular date and the end of each of the phases matched with a milestone. The presentations to the 
management board as well as the status reports were also centrally prepared and published by PMO. 
The data on both, the cost estimations and the cost figures for the particular IS projects, were centrally 
stored in an excel spreadsheet and was made available to the researchers in this form. As a 
consequence, the data was comfortable to analyse and apart from normalisation (for reasons of 
confidentiality), no codification was needed. 
The process of estimating costs (incl. activities, responsibilities, point in time) was defined in the 
‘governance guidelines’: The purpose of this document was to establish processes and structures 
particularly for the IS transformation program. Thus, the process of estimating costs was standardised 
for all IS projects. PMO was responsible for setting up and updating the governance guidelines. 
3 Determining Estimation Accuracy at a German FSP 
As already mentioned, the case study was conducted within an IS transformation program at a large 
German FSP lasting from 2008 to 2012. The planned budgets amounted to a total of more than 100 
Mio. EUR. The main goal of this program was to consolidate the scattered IS landscape while 
simultaneously reducing process costs and enhancing key functionalities. In the following, we first 
discuss how the project portfolio was set up and how the projects were structured in order to provide 
the reader with a clearer understanding of the background. Second, we describe how and by whom the 
costs of the IS projects were estimated. Third, we determine the accuracy of the cost estimations. 
3.1 Project Setting 
Before any IS project was planned or even conducted, all business domains that were involved in the 
transformation first had to define so-called management requirements. Each of these requirements 
defined a particular scope, which comprised the transformation or creation of an existing or new 
information system. At this early stage of the program, the corresponding scope description was not 
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very detailed. Nevertheless, each management requirement was labelled with associated costs 
estimated by experts (details on the expert-based estimations are given in section 3.2). This way, the 
management board was able to decide on whether or not to implement these management 
requirements already at the very beginning of the IS transformation program. Next, the management 
requirements that were to be realised were grouped into several releases according to their priority and 
temporal interdependencies. The releases succeeded each other (with partly overlapping time periods). 
Second, based on the management requirements, the IS projects were defined within the first phase of 
a release: the work it took to establish a solution to a management requirement was usually organised 
within one project; sometimes, several management requirements were combined into one IS project. 
Third, within IS projects, the project work was done by two major groups: The IS demand teams on 
the one side and the IS supply teams on the other side. The IS demand teams were responsible for the 
business side of the IS projects in terms of defining the requirements as well as designing and 
executing test cases. The IS supply teams were each responsible for a particular application and had to 
make sure that these applications are adapted/designed in a way that they meet the requirements. 
From a timeline perspective, the IS projects were organised along successive phases: During the first 
phase of the actual conduction of the project (‘scope agreement’), the IS demand teams broke down 
the management requirements into more detailed project requirements in close collaboration with the 
demanding business domains. In the next phase of the project (‘specification’), both IS demand teams 
and IS supply teams created a specification document which denoted a precise description of the 
business requirements. Again, this was done on the granularity level of the project requirements. 
Thereafter, the scope of the project was considered to be stable and the implementation work began. 
However, even after the phase ‘specification’, cost estimations were changing due to changes within 
the requirements. Such changes are managed through change requests.  
During the phase ‘delivery’, the software was implemented and tested. The phase ended with the 
milestone ‘Go live’. After the ‘Go live’ there was a six-week period of ‘post-go live support’, after 
which the project was over (‘project end’). 
During the overall IS transformation program, 6 releases and 97 IS projects had been completed. It can 
be said that the scope that was implemented possessed good quality. Furthermore, any time overruns 
materialised in cost overruns, which is why we focus on the cost estimation in the following. 
3.2 Cost Estimation 
After outlining the organisation of the IS projects, the cost estimation process is described in the 
following. The description is split into two parts: First, we describe the generic cost estimation 
structure, i.e. the actual cost estimating approach, according to which the experts estimated the costs in 
each of the projects’ phases. Second, we describe important aspects of the cost estimations that differ 
within different phases. 
All cost estimations were based on the requirements (i.e. either management or project requirements). 
For each requirement, it was estimated how many internal and external person days (PD) were 
necessary for both the IS demand teams and the IS supply teams. The estimated PDs always included 
the total effort for an IS project in terms of the following activities: analysis, design, specification, 
implementation, test, post roll-out support and hand-over to maintenance. Internal staff was priced 
with a daily rate of 0 EUR, since the budget controlling was focused on additional accounts payable 
caused by the IS projects and internal staff members therefore did not cause any (additional) costs. In 
contrast, for each group of externals a daily rate was estimated by the experts and afterwards 
multiplied with the corresponding PDs. Non person-related investments (e.g. hardware, software) were 
also estimated in each phase as a monetary sum, but account only for a relatively small portion of the 
whole program budget. 
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The cost estimations in all phases were done according to the structure depicted in Table 1: 
 
 IS Demand 
Team A 
IS Demand 
Team B 
… IS Supply 
Team X 
IS Supply 
Team Y 
… Soft-
ware 
Hard-
ware 
 Ext. Int. Ext. Int.  Ext. In
t. 
Ext. Int.    
Requirement 
(Person Days) 
40 50 20 210  320 12
3 
45 80  - - 
Daily Rate 
(EUR) 
500 0 400 0  600 0 700 0  - - 
Budget Require-
ment (EUR) 
20,000 0 8,000 0  192,000 0 31,500 0  9,000 4,000 
Table 1. Generic Cost Estimation Structure (Example) 
As mentioned earlier, the costs were not only estimated in the beginning, but also during several 
phases of each IS project. The reason for this (as documented in the governance guidelines of the IS 
transformation program) was the assumption, that the more precise the requirements were specified in 
later phases, the more accurate the needed budgets could be estimated. 
Over the project phases there were differences concerning the estimation base (How granular was the 
requirements description broken down?), and the estimator (Who were the experts to estimate?). The 
main characteristics of the cost estimation process are depicted in Table 2. 
 
Project 
Phase 
Program 
Planning 
Scope Agreement Specification Delivery Project End 
Estimation 
Stage 
Initial 
estimation 
Scope-based 
estimation 
Specification-
based estimation 
Specification-based 
estimation plus 
change requests 
Costs 
determination 
Estimation 
base 
Management 
Requirement 
Project Requirement Project 
Requirement 
Project 
Requirement 
Project 
Estimator Program 
Management 
IS Demand Team 
Project Leads, IS 
Supply Team Leads 
IS Supply Team 
Leads 
IS Demand Team 
Project Leads, IS 
Supply Team Leads 
Accounting 
Table 2. Different Characteristics of the Estimation Process in different Project Phases 
Phase I: Program Planning: At the beginning of the IS transformation program an initial estimation 
for the whole program was conducted by three experts, which were members of the program 
management. During a period of four weeks, the three experts sat together in several meetings that 
lasted three to six hours. The goal was to agree on the estimations in terms of PDs for each 
management requirement and the daily rate per team accordingly. There was no formal structure for 
the meetings besides an excel file representing the estimation structure as given in Table 1. The 
experts used a task-based approach by asking “What must be done to meet this requirement?” and 
assigning a number of estimated person days to the discussed task. Another approach was to ask for 
the number of people that are necessary to fulfil a requirement and thus derive the necessary number 
of PDs. It should also be mentioned that – during the meetings – the three experts also contacted other 
experts (for instance via phone) for further information on the required scope or on necessary effort. 
The resulting estimations were gathered in the excel file mentioned earlier and proposed to the 
management board for approval and used as budgets afterwards. 
Phase II: Scope Agreement: The next cost estimation took place after the IS projects had been 
defined. Compared to the initial estimation, two characteristics changed in this phase: First, the 
estimations were now done based on a more detailed description of the scope (so called ‘scope 
agreement’). The IS demand teams had about 2 month time for (a) breaking down the scope of the 
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management requirements, which should be realised through the particular project, into several project 
requirements and (b) providing a more detailed description of the associated scope. Consequently, the 
costs were then estimated for each project requirement. Second, the experts changed: The IS demand 
team project lead was responsible for the IS demand team estimations, whereas the head of each IS 
supply team estimated the efforts for their applications. Both roles could be considered as more 
experienced in their particular subject than the original three experts. These ‘scope-based estimations’ 
were collected according to the structure of Table 1. 
Phase III: Specification: During the ‘specification’ phase (lasting 3 months), the IS demand teams 
detailed the project requirements further. However, no additional breakdown of the project 
requirements took place. Whereas the budget of the IS demand teams remained the same as after the 
scope-based estimation, the IS supply teams were allowed to adapt their estimated costs based on the 
new insights generated through the more detailed project requirements. Again, the structure of the 
estimations followed Table 1. 
Phase IV: Delivery: After the ‘specification’ phase, the estimated costs were supposed to be stable for 
each IS project. From that time on, costs – and thus budgets – could only be adapted via change 
requests. Change Requests were the means to deal with changing requirements during the project work 
on the one hand and wrong planning assumptions on the other hand. As a consequence, change 
requests contained estimations that followed the same level of detail and structure as in previous 
phases. Whereas the IS demand teams had to submit change requests for changing their cost 
estimations after the phase ‘scope agreement’, the IS supply teams had to do this after the phase 
‘specification’. Each change request had to be approved by program management. 
Phase V: Project End: The final data series are actual realised costs for all IS demand and supply 
teams per project. As a consequence, there are five cost values for each project; four cost estimation 
values (by experts in different phases of the projects) and the resulting actual costs. They serve as 
benchmarks to which the different costs estimates provided by the experts are compared in section 4.3.  
As can be seen, all data used for this case study were officially recorded; hence, they are documentary 
in its nature. Consequently, the authors do not consider further data triangulation necessary in order to 
answer the research question in an objective way. 
3.3 Cost Estimation Accuracy 
In this section, the accuracy of the cost estimations is analysed using the measures introduced in 
section 2 (i.e. EQF, FE, and MAPE(Est)) and the results are discussed. Thus the cost estimates of the 
different project phases described in section 3.2 were used (we aggregated the estimates from the IS 
demand and IS supply teams) and the estimation accuracy measures were computed via Excel. First, 
we provide some examples for the computation of the three metrics and discuss their interrelation. 
Second the overall estimation accuracy of the whole transformation program is analysed from a top 
down perspective. Third, the estimation accuracy of the 79 single IS projects of the transformation 
program is determined. The corresponding results are depicted in Figure 1, where all IS projects are 
ordered by descending EQF (Figure 1a). Further, the FE and the MAPE(Est) were calculated for each 
IS project, whereas the order of the projects within the Figures 1b/1c stays the same as in Figure 1a. 
In order to illustrate the computation of the metrics we use project 19 as an example. Starting with the 
EQF, we note that for each project there were four time periods (lasting t1 = 81d, t2 = 98d, t3 = 248d, t4 
= 42d) leading to five estimations e1 = 1.887.546 EUR, e2 = 2.069.734 EUR, e3 = 2.477.480 EUR, e4 = 
2.437.378 EUR and actuals of a5 = 2.360.425 EUR. The EQF for project 19 was then calculated as: 
 =
 +  +  + 
 −  +  − 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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Kaiser and Ullrich / Estimation Accuracy in Large IS Programs 
 
 
Twenty Second European Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 2014                                         9 
 
 
 =
81 + 98 + 248 + 42 × 2.360.425
81 × 427.879 + 98 × 290.691 + 248 × 117.055 + 42 × 76.953
= 11.18 
The FE for project 19 was calculated as a5 – e1 = 472.879 EUR, MAPE(Est) as (a5 – e1) / e1 = 25.05%. 
It can be seen that all formulas include the difference between the actual accrued costs a5 and the 
initial estimation e1. The FE consists of this difference only, where the MAPE(Est) puts this difference 
into perspective by relating it to the initial estimation. Both perspectives were relevant in the IS 
transformation program: When addressing over-/underspending of budgets (especially between start 
and end of the projects), the FE was relevant in order to decide on (re-)allocating budgets, as these 
were decisions on amounts of money. In contrast, MAPE(Est) was used for discussions on estimation 
quality itself, as a deviation of 50.000 EUR was considered as relative large for a project with an 
initial estimation of 100.000 EUR, whereas the same deviation was hardly discussed for projects with 
an initial estimation of 1.000.000 EUR. Both, FE and MAPE(Est), can have negative values which was 
also a valuable information for management in terms of over-/underspending of budgets. The EQF 
also relies on the difference between actuals and initial estimation, but apart from this, differs in 
several aspects. First, it uses the absolute values of the differences (a not uncommon perspective of 
deviations), i.e. the (for management purpose often valuable) information on over-/underspending of 
budgets is lost. Second, the EQF does not only incorporate the difference between initial estimation 
and actuals, but also between all other estimations and the actuals and weighs these differences with 
the duration how long these estimations were valid. This means, that the EQF can provide the same 
direction of judgement as FE and MAPE(Est), but – as will be illustrated later – it can also judge quite 
differently. The example above also illustrates how the estimations vary across the different phases: 
Whereas the estimations rise from the initial until the specification-based estimation, they drop 
afterwards again towards the actuals. However, the actuals are still clearly higher than the initial 
estimation.  
Concerning the results, it can be stated – from a top down perspective – that for the overall IS 
transformation program the average EQF value is 8.09, whereas the median only accumulates to 4.03. 
According to the discussion about the interpretation of the EQF (cf. section 2), we can conclude that 
the overall estimation accuracy based on the EQF is better than the results of the IS industry 
(DeMarco 1982), but worse to the result of the FSP (Eveleens and Verhoef 2009). 
Regarding the FE, all deviations amount to an overall deviation of 26.66 million EUR (in this 
calculation, positive and negative deviations compensate each other, as on the level of the complete 
project portfolio of the program, budgets not spent for project A could be spent for project B). 
Comparing this deviation to the 129.5 million EUR initial cost estimates leads to the third indicator, 
i.e. a MAPE(Est) of 16.54%. Unfortunately, literature doesn’t provide defined thresholds that allow for 
an objective interpretation of the value determined by using the MAPE(Est): For instance, Whitaker 
(1993) denotes a MAPE(Est) value greater 30% as ‘project failure’ and values greater 50% as ‘serious 
budget overruns’. According to Eveleens and Verhoef (2010), the Standish group calls projects with 
MAPE(Est) values greater 0% ‘challenged’; Compared to the more arbitrary thresholds 30% and 50%, 
0% comes closest to an objective threshold, as it separates over- from underestimation. Hence, using 
this scale, the overall program can be considered as “challenged”, but it is far from “failure”. 
Comparing the MAPE(Est) of 16.54% of the IS transformation program to the MAPE(Est) values of 
several studies summed up by Eveleens and Verhoef (2009, p. 983), we can state that the value of the 
IS transformation program is amongst the lowest (minimum 13%) of these values. Consequently, 
based on MAPE(Est), the estimation accuracy can be considered as good. It can be seen that EQF and 
MAPE(Est) lead to somewhat differing judgements on the estimation accuracy of the IS 
transformation program. Another fact is noteworthy in this context: The program management added a 
contingency buffer to the cost estimations during the phase ‘initial estimation’:
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Figure 1. Estimation Accuracy Measures of all 79 IS projects. 
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Figure 1c: Mean Absolute Percentage Error (Est)  
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This amounted to 25% for the first three releases and 15% for the forth and fifth release. I.e., program 
management already anticipated some inaccuracy in the initial estimations. Taking into account this 
contingency buffer, there was no budget overrun on the level of the whole IS transformation program.  
Taking a look at the single IS projects, we observe EQF values ranging from 55.49 (project 1) to 0.29 
(project 79). As DeMarco (1981) considers an EQF value higher than 4.00 as a figure for good 
estimation accuracy, we require a bit more and put an EQF value of 5.00 as the corresponding 
threshold. Thus, we can state that 34 of the 79 IS projects show good estimation accuracy (“well 
estimated”), whereas the remaining 45 IS projects can be considered as “poorly estimated”. The 
“poorly estimated” IS projects caused 81.20% of all budget overruns. 
It is important to note that we were not able to find any connection between the project size (measured 
through costs) and the corresponding accuracy estimate. Further, the analysis of the FE values of the 
IS projects goes in line with the results obtained by the EQF: The higher the EQF, the lower the FE 
tends to be. The same holds true for the analysis of the MAPE(Est). As Figure 1c shows, the 
MAPE(Est) tends to increase with decreasing EQF. This is shown in the following table: 
 
 Well estimated IS projects Poorly estimated IS projects 
Median FE 17,979 EUR 220,333 EUR 
Median MAPE(Est) 2.81% 50.77% 
Table 3. FE and MAPE(Est) of all IS projects 
Given the information of the different estimation accuracy measures on the same IS projects as shown 
above, we will now discuss the results. One difference that attracts the reader’s attention is that the 
EQF leads to positive values, whereas the FE and the MAPE(Est) result in positive and negative 
values. As Figure 1 reveals there is no connection between the value of the EQF and the fact whether 
FE or MAPE(Est) are positive or negative. This is due to the definition of the EQF, which takes 
positive and negative deviations equally into account, since a deviation from the estimated costs in 
either direction is considered as not desirable and represents bad estimation accuracy. This two-side 
perspective on deviations represents the management’s ex-ante view on estimation accuracy when 
deciding which IS projects to include in the portfolio, because deviations in both directions lead to 
suboptimal decisions: If projects are underestimated at this stage, more effort will be needed during 
the project, which leads to higher costs. In contrast, if projects are overestimated, too much budget is 
allocated towards them. Consequently, other projects might be denied due to missing budget. 
However, given the fact that the projects were successful in terms of scope as mentioned earlier, 
lower-than-expected costs are more preferable than higher costs in that real business environment. 
This especially holds true during the projects, when the “saved” costs might be urgently needed in 
other projects. Hence, FE, MAPE(Est), and other measures which distinguish between positive and 
negative deviations are suitable for both project controlling and evaluating estimation accuracy, 
whereas EQF and similar measures rather focus on evaluating the estimation accuracy. Against the 
background of the case study, the authors can report that the EQF was not used for reporting during 
the IS transformation program; cost estimations were – upon request from management – put in 
relation to the estimations of earlier phases in terms of absolute (FE) or relative (MAPE(Est)) values. 
Despite the major correspondence between EQF, FE, and MAPE(Est) as reported in Table 3, there are 
also some projects which are judged quite differently according to the three measures: 
Considering project 5 e.g., it can be stated that although the overall estimation accuracy can be 
considered as rather good (EQF = 26.32), the FE value was -525.485 EUR and the MAPE(Est) 
amounted to -9.07%. As mentioned earlier, the amount “saved” might have helped to add additional 
resources to other projects which were underestimated. In any case, at least 20 out of the 79 projects 
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could have been financed out of the saved amount of money based on their ‘initial estimation’; it 
seems discussable whether the judgement of the EQF as good is adequate for such a misallocation of 
budget and resources. Project 19 is another project which is judged quite differently according to the 
three measures; whereas its EQF of 11.18 seems to be a good estimate (referring to a EQF threshold 
value of 5.00), the “initial estimation” was overrun by +472.879 EUR (FE), corresponding to a 
MAPE(Est) of +25.05%. Taking into account that the additionally needed budget could not be spent 
otherwise, resources were blocked for other tasks. Further, since the MAPE(Est) value is close to a 
project failure (according to the 30% threshold by Whitaker (1993)), an evaluation as ‘good’ might 
seem inadequate. However, the high EQF can be explained as follows: Indeed, the “initial estimation” 
is clearly differing from the accrued costs, but this deviation was detected already early in the project 
and the initial estimation was replaced by a more accurate one. As this second and more accurate 
estimation was valid for a longer time period, it got a higher weight and thus outweighed the more 
inaccurate initial estimation. Similar considerations can be made for the projects 28, 31, and 33: All 
three projects have an EQF greater 5.00 and therefore possess a good estimation quality, but they all 
have a MAPE(Est) of greater +30.00% and would be therefore considered as failure by Whitaker 
(1993). Further, two of them have a FE of more than +1.000.000 EUR. 
If we analyse IS projects that were well estimated according to MAPE(Est), we reveal the results 
depictured in Table 4. It seems that MAPE(Est) values around 15.00% come along with an EQF of 
below 5.00. Assuming that 5.00 divides good from bad estimations, a MAPE(Est) value 15.00% might 
also be a suitable value to distinguish a good estimation accuracy from a bad one. 
 
MAPE(Est) Threshold Number of IS projects (EQF > 5) Number of IS projects (EQF < 5) 
≤ 12.00% 22 - 
≤ 15.00% 27 2 
≤ 20.00% 33 5 
Table 4. Number of IS projects related to different thresholds of MAPE(Est) 
Besides comparing the judgments expressed via the three different measures, we also examined 
whether there was any correlation between the estimation accuracies within the different releases. 
Table 5 depicts the results of the metrics for the five releases.  
 
Release EQF FE MAPE(Est) 
 Median Average Median Average Median Average 
1 6.67 4.68 62,912 366,942 18.10% 23.90% 
2 8.10 9.42 -767 37,934 0.46% 0.81% 
3 3.62 5.06 24,310 264,082 9.42% 37.49% 
4 4.55 6.85 82,429 373,589 8.51% 21.76% 
5 2.57 4.27 821,844 775,296 92.02% 137.32% 
Table 5. Median and Average for EQF, FE, and MAPE(Est) of project in different releases 
It can be seen that the different metrics only agree on the best (release 2) and the worst (release 5) 
estimation accuracy. Releases 1, 3, and 4 are ranked in between, but the order differs depending upon 
which measurement is chosen. One can also note that estimations did not get better from release to 
release, as one could have expected: The estimation accuracy of the last release is the worst. Analysing 
the reasons for this is subject to further research. 
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Summing up, we can state the following answers to our research question: 
(a) The estimation accuracy of the IS transformation program can be considered to be average. The 
different measures lied within already documented ranges that partially were considered as acceptable. 
However, it is interesting to see that the contingency buffer (initiated by the program management at 
the beginning of the program) almost exactly covered the cost overruns. Therefore, a MAPE(Est) of 
16% seemed to be acceptable and was even anticipated by the IT executives of the FSP. 
(b) We found that estimation accuracy measures judge cost overruns differently. As we elaborated 
above, the use of multiple measures provides valuable information about the real estimation accuracy. 
Especially the EQF has major drawbacks when the measure should be used for management purposes: 
First, its results are not normalised and the values are hard to interpret. Second, the information of 
under-/overestimation is lost. On the contrary, the EQF is the only metric that takes into account more 
than one estimation. 
3.4 Implications and Limitations 
The following implications for researchers’ future work can be derived: First, it seems that there is 
room for improvement regarding measures for estimation accuracy in IS projects. FE and MAPE(Est) 
are practically useful measures, but they only take into account a single estimation and the accrued 
cost. In contrast, EQF aggregates several cost estimations made at different points in time. 
Researchers might keep this advantage of the EQF while developing it further in order to (a) align its 
results with the ones of other measures (b) incorporate requirements like normalisation, 
interpretability, or aggregation in order to make it more comprehensible for management purposes. 
Practitioners might benefit from the described process of cost estimations that provided good results. 
Moreover, the discussion of the different estimation accuracy measures might guide the selection of a 
suitable measure in real-life business environment. The first limitation consists of the fact that we 
only studied IS projects of one particular company. Although the data set can be considered very rich, 
an application of similar studies at different companies is desirable. Further, we only conducted a 
descriptive case study by answering the research question “How good or bad was the estimation 
accuracy?”. Thus, the study does not answer the question “Why was the estimation accuracy good or 
bad?”. Answering this question is also subject for further research. 
4 Conclusion 
Against the background of a large number of reports on budget overruns of IS projects, we described 
the cost estimation process and the cost estimation accuracy of 79 IS projects in this case study. 
Therefore, the estimation accuracy measures Estimating Quality Factor, Forecast Error, and Mean 
Absolute Percentage Error were applied. Whereas for some IS projects serious budget overruns could 
be identified, the overall estimation accuracy of all projects in terms of the MAPE(Est) was amongst 
the lowest reported in literature. In addition, the results of different measures of cost estimation 
accuracy were compared to each other. Thereby it became apparent that the estimation accuracy 
measures used in this paper judge accuracy differently: Whereas the measure EQF takes into account 
all estimations made during the project as well as the duration how long these estimates were valid, FE 
and MAPE(Est) only focus on a single estimation and the accrued costs. Further, the EQF doesn’t 
account for the direction of the deviations.  
Given the results obtained in this case study, we agree with Eveleens and Verhoef (2009) and believe 
that information about the estimation accuracy – and thus about the quality of the cost estimation 
process – is crucial for IT executives. However, improving the quality of the cost estimations is only 
one step towards lower budget overruns of IS projects. Another element are measures which are taken 
to make the costs meet the estimations during the duration of the projects. The authors are currently 
working on a theory explaining the effect of budget control on budget overruns of IS projects.  
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